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I.

INTRODUCTION

When a stockholder plaintiff claims that a corporate decision
constituted a breach of fiduciary duty, a court applying Delaware
law searches for an independent, disinterested, and sufficiently
1
informed decision maker. If one exists, then the court defers to
the decision that the qualified decision maker made. Only in the
absence of a qualified decision maker will the court assume that
role for itself.
This animating principle drives the selection of the standard of
review that the court uses to determine whether a corporate

†
Vice Chancellor, Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware. On
October 8, 2013, Vice Chancellor Laster delivered the Dorsey & Whitney
Foundation Lecture at William Mitchell College of Law. Portions of this article
formed the basis for his remarks.
1. To shorten the list of necessary attributes, this article refers to an
independent, disinterested, and sufficiently informed decision maker as a
“qualified decision maker.”
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fiduciary has breached its duties. Delaware law has three basic
standards of review for evaluating fiduciary decision making: the
business judgment rule, enhanced scrutiny, and entire fairness. A
court applying Delaware law moves among the standards
depending on the degree to which a qualified decision maker
exists.
Delaware decisions explain how the standard of review
escalates from the business judgment rule to entire fairness and
back again. Delaware decisions similarly identify the specific
situations that call for augmenting the standard of review from the
business judgment rule to enhanced scrutiny. But Delaware cases
address to a far lesser degree how the standard of review can
diminish from enhanced scrutiny to the business judgment rule.
As a matter of first principles, in a situation where enhanced
scrutiny applies, stockholder approval by a disinterested,
uncoerced, and fully informed stockholder majority should restore
the business judgment rule. To the extent the board is
compromised by the situational pressures that trigger enhanced
scrutiny, the collective body of disinterested and informed
stockholders should be able to act as a qualified decision maker to
which a court would defer. This should be true even if stockholder
approval was required under the Delaware General Corporation
2
Law (DGCL) for the act to become effective.
To date, the Delaware Supreme Court has not yet addressed
this issue, and at least two Delaware Supreme Court decisions
arguably indicate that an organic vote will not affect the standard of
3
review when enhanced scrutiny applies. The Santa Fe opinion
could be read to hold that an organic vote on a merger otherwise
reviewable under enhanced scrutiny will not change the standard
of review that governs defensive measures adopted separately or as

2. For simplicity, this article uses the term “organic vote” to refer to a
stockholder vote that is required under the DGCL for the corporate action to
become effective. This article uses the term “voluntary vote” to refer to a
stockholder vote that is not required for the corporate action to become effective.
An example of the former is the vote on a long-form merger. See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 251(b) (West, Westlaw through 79 Laws 2014). An example of the latter is
the vote to adopt a stock option plan. See id. § 157. The adjective “organic” is
suggested by the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Williams v. Geier, which
referred to a statutorily required vote as part of the “organic act.” 671 A.2d 1368,
1379 n.24 (Del. 1996).
3. In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995).
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part of the merger agreement. The Gantler v. Stephens decision
could be read to hold more broadly that an organic vote will never
have any effect on the standard of review.
A thorough examination of Santa Fe and Gantler reveals them
to be part of a quarter-century effort by the Delaware courts to
clarify confusion inadvertently created by loose language about
5
stockholder ratification in Smith v. Van Gorkom. As Gantler makes
clear, ratification is a narrow legal concept that comes into play
when one decision maker has made a decision unilaterally. If the
decision is challenged, a second decision maker with equal or
greater authority can ratify the original decision by agreeing
formally with the first decision maker. If a decision requires two
approvals to be effective, then technically the second approval is
not a form of ratification, but rather part of the original decision.
Ratification, therefore, cannot strictly apply to an organic vote
required under the DGCL for corporate action to become effective.
In Gantler, the Delaware Supreme Court limited the use of the
term “ratification” to its “classic” sense, namely, situations where
6
one decision maker has made a decision unilaterally. The Gantler
decision expressly overruled Van Gorkom to the extent it used the
term “ratification” to refer to an organic vote, such as the
7
stockholder vote on charter amendment or a long-form merger.
The high court incorporated Santa Fe into this more limited view of
ratification and took pains to specify that its decision did not alter
other aspects of stockholder approval jurisprudence, such as case
law interpreting section 144 of the DGCL or decisions holding that
only unanimous stockholder approval can validate acts of waste. In
doing so, the Gantler decision sharpened the distinction drawn in
8
Williams v. Geier between the doctrine of “classic” ratification,
which applies to voluntary votes, and the concept of stockholder
approval, which encompasses organic votes. As the Williams court

4. 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
5. 488 A.2d 858, 889–90 (Del. 1985), overruled in part by Gantler, 965 A.2d.
at 713 n.54.
6. Gantler, 965 A.2d at 713.
7. See id. at 713 n.54; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242, 251 (Westlaw)
(detailing amending certificates of incorporation after receipt of payment for
stock, and mergers and consolidations, respectively).
8. 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996).
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admonished, the former are “entirely different” from and “not
9
relevant” to the latter.
Authorities on “classic” ratification, including Santa Fe and
Gantler, simply do not speak to the separate issue of the effect that
an organic vote has on the applicable standard of review.
Consistent with the premise of deference to a qualified corporate
decision maker, if a fully informed, uncoerced, and disinterested
stockholder majority votes in favor of a merger otherwise subject to
enhanced scrutiny, then the business judgment rule should
become the operative standard of review. This should be true even
when the stockholder approval comes from an organic vote.
Consequently, any complaint challenging such a transaction should
no longer benefit from enhanced scrutiny’s reasonableness
standard or the shifting of the burden of proof to the defendants.
Instead, the plaintiff should be required to plead facts sufficient to
overcome the business judgment rule’s presumptions.
II. THREE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Delaware has three basic standards of review for evaluating
decisions made by fiduciaries: the business judgment rule,
enhanced scrutiny, and entire fairness. Together, they form a
pyramid of narrowing deference to corporate decision making and
increasing judicial intrusiveness. Travel aficionados can imagine a
three-step Mayan pyramid. The gastronomically inclined can
picture a three-tiered wedding cake.
At the bottom of the pyramid is the business judgment rule,
which gives the pyramid a capaciously broad foundation. For
decisions at this level, a qualified corporate decision maker exists,
so a reviewing court effectively abstains from reviewing the
10
substance of the corporate decision. The only residuum for
9. Id. at 1379 (distinguishing between (1) cases “where stockholders are
called upon to ratify action which may involve a transaction with an interested
director or where the transaction approved by the board may otherwise be
voidable,” and (2) cases involving “the effect of corporate action which, in order to
become operative, requires and receives both approval by the board of directors
and the stockholders,” and “put[ting] to one side” the former category of cases as
“not relevant” and “entirely different” when considering an organic vote under
section 242 of the DGCL).
10. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig. (Trados I), Civ. A. No. 1512-CC, 2009
WL 2225958, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009) (noting that the business judgment
rule is a principle of judicial nonreview that “reflects and promotes the role of the
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judicial review is limited to decisions so irrational as to suggest bad
11
faith. Irrationality is an extreme standard, making the bottom
layer of the pyramid expansively wide.
At the top of the pyramid is the narrowest tier, representing
entire fairness. At this level, the plaintiff has shown that the board
could not act as a qualified decision maker, so the court must use
its own judgment. Under entire fairness, the defendant directors
have the burden “to demonstrate that the challenged act or
transaction was entirely fair to the corporation and its
12
shareholders.” To meet this test, they must show that the action
they took was both procedurally and substantively fair by
establishing “to the court’s satisfaction that the transaction was the
13
product of both fair dealing and fair price.” “Not even an honest
belief that the transaction was entirely fair will be sufficient to
establish entire fairness. Rather, the transaction itself must be
14
objectively fair, independent of the board’s beliefs.”

board of directors as the proper body to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation”). See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as
Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004) (exploring the necessary balance
between authority and accountability in judicial review of operational business
decisions).
11. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 906 A.2d 27, 52
(Del. 2006) (“[W]here business judgment presumptions are applicable, the
board’s decision will be upheld unless it cannot be ‘attributed to any rational
business purpose.’” (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720
(Del. 1971))); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (“Irrationality is the
outer limit of the business judgment rule. Irrationality may be the functional
equivalent of the waste test or it may tend to show that the decision is not made in
good faith, which is a key ingredient of the business judgment rule.” (footnotes
omitted)); In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 598 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(explaining that unless one of the elements of the business judgment rule is
rebutted, “the court merely looks to see whether the business decision made was
rational in the sense of being one logical approach to advancing the corporation’s
objectives”); In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780–81
(Del. Ch. 1988) (“A court may, however, review the substance of a business
decision made by an apparently well motivated board for the limited purpose of
assessing whether that decision is so far beyond the bounds of reasonable
judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad
faith.”).
12. Disney II, 906 A.2d at 52; accord Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85,
91 (Del. 2001); see Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 n.66.
13. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor Plenary IV), 663 A.2d
1156, 1163 (Del. 1995).
14. Gesoff v. IIC Indus., Inc., 902 A.2d 1130, 1145 (Del. Ch. 2006).
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Even under entire fairness, however, a lingering degree of
deference to the corporate decision maker remains, so the top level
of the pyramid should be imagined as a narrow tier rather than a
spire. “‘[P]erfection is not possible, or expected’ as a condition
15
precedent to a judicial determination of entire fairness.” The
board must act in a procedurally fair manner, but directors will not
be held to have breached their duties simply because they failed to
deploy an idealized level of protection. The same is true for the
substantive terms of a transaction. “The value of a corporation is
16
not a point on a line, but a range of reasonable values . . . .”
Consequently, when conducting the fair price aspect of entire
fairness, the court asks whether the transaction was one “that a
reasonable seller, under all of the circumstances, would regard as
within a range of fair value; one that such a seller could reasonably
17
accept.” On both price and process, there is play in the joints, and
the two dimensions are interrelated: “A strong record of fair
dealing can influence the fair price inquiry, reinforcing the unitary
nature of the entire fairness test. The converse is equally true:
18
process can infect price.” These unavoidable ambiguities in the
test, combined with the inherent vagaries of litigation and a natural
reluctance to substitute judicial judgment for business persons’
decision making, preserve a de facto element of deference even
19
under the entire fairness test.
Sandwiched between the top and bottom is a middle tier,
representing enhanced scrutiny. “Enhanced scrutiny applies to
specific, recurring, and readily identifiable situations involving
15. Technicolor Plenary IV, 663 A.2d at 1179 (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983)).
16. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor Appraisal III), Civ. A.
No. 7129, 2003 WL 23700218, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part on other grounds, 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005).
17. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor Plenary III), 663 A.2d
1134, 1143 (Del. Ch. 1994), aff’d, 663 A.2d 1156; see also Kahn v. Tremont Corp.,
Civ. A. No. 12339, 1996 WL 145452, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 1996) (“A fair price is
a price that is within a range that reasonable men and women with access to
relevant information might accept.”), rev’d on other grounds, 694 A.2d 422
(Del. 1997).
18. Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 467 (Del. Ch. 2011).
19. See Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1243–44 (Del. 2012)
(“[J]udicial review for entire fairness of how the transaction was structured,
negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and approved by the directors will be
significantly influenced by the work product of a properly functioning special
committee of independent directors.”).
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potential conflicts of interest where the realities of the
decisionmaking context can subtly undermine the decisions of
20
even independent and disinterested directors.” Those conflicts
are not sufficiently strong to trigger entire fairness, but they also do
21
not comfortably permit business judgment deference. In those

20. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig. (Trados II), 73 A.3d 17, 43 (Del. Ch.
2013); accord Reis, 28 A.3d at 457–59; see Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176, 180–82 (Del. 1986) (applying Unocal test to the
sale of a corporation in light of concern that the directors rebuffed a premium
acquisition offer and agreed to a white knight transaction, because (i) the target
CEO felt a “strong personal antipathy” towards the acquirer, and (ii) the directors
feared potential litigation by noteholders); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (creating enhanced scrutiny to address the
“omnipresent specter” that when resisting a hostile takeover, target directors may
be influenced by and act to further their own interests or those of incumbent
management, “rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders”); see also
In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 439 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“[T]he
potential sale of a corporation has enormous implications for corporate managers
and advisors, and a range of human motivations, including but by no means
limited to greed, can inspire fiduciaries and their advisors to be less than
faithful . . . .”). The Delaware Supreme Court extended the rubric of enhanced
scrutiny to incorporate the principles that animated Chancellor Allen’s decision in
Blasius Industries and directed that they be applied “within the . . . enhanced
standard of judicial review.” MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118,
1129 (Del. 2003) (relying on Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651
(Del. Ch. 1988)); accord Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 n.3 (Del. 1992).
Commentators have argued that judicial review of the special litigation committee
(SLC) process under Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981), is best
understood as a form of enhanced scrutiny. See Gregory V. Varallo et al., From
Kahn to Carlton: Recent Developments in Special Committee Practice, 53 BUS. LAW. 397,
423 n.121 (1998) (explaining that the two-step Zapata test is “reminiscent of the
enhanced scrutiny courts use to examine the actions of directors engaged in a sale
of a corporation or other like transactions”); Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the
Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 851 (2004) (discussing standard
and concluding that “Zapata is thus quite similar to Unocal”).
21. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42
(Del. 1993) (“[T]here are rare situations which mandate that a court take a more
direct and active role in overseeing the decisions made and actions taken by
directors. In these situations, a court subjects the directors’ conduct to enhanced
scrutiny to ensure that it is reasonable.”); In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig.,
14 A.3d 573, 597 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Avoiding a crude bifurcation of the world into
two starkly divergent categories—business judgment rule review reflecting a policy
of maximal deference to disinterested board decisionmaking and entire fairness
review reflecting a policy of extreme skepticism toward self-dealing decisions—the
Delaware Supreme Court’s Unocal and Revlon decisions adopted a middle
ground.”).
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contexts, “the predicate question of what the board’s true
motivation was comes into play,” and “[t]he court must take a
nuanced and realistic look at the possibility that personal interests
22
short of pure self-dealing have influenced the board.” Framed
generally, enhanced scrutiny requires that the defendant
fiduciaries “bear the burden of persuasion to show that their
motivations were proper and not selfish” and that “their actions
23
were reasonable in relation to their legitimate objective.”
Reasonableness review is an objective standard, but not one
that contemplates a single, “reasonable” answer. Rather, a court
determines whether the challenged corporate decision falls within
a reasonable range of objectively constrained discretion:
[A] court applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be
deciding whether the directors made a reasonable decision,
not a perfect decision. If a board selected one of several
reasonable alternatives, a court should not second-guess
that choice even though it might have decided otherwise
or subsequent events may have cast doubt on the board’s
determination. Thus, courts will not substitute their
business judgment for that of the directors, but will
determine if the directors’ decision was, on balance,
24
within a range of reasonableness.
The resulting standard creates a middle tier narrower than the
rationality standard of the business judgment rule but broader than
25
the entire fairness test.
III. SHIFTING BETWEEN THE STANDARDS
In a corporation, generally speaking, there are two decision
makers that potentially can address an issue: the board of directors
26
and the stockholders. A court applying Delaware law determines
22. Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 598.
23. Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 810 (Del. Ch. 2007).
24. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d at 45.
25. See Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 598 (“In that middle ground [of enhanced
scrutiny], the reviewing court has leeway to examine the reasonableness of the
board’s actions under a standard that is more stringent than business judgment
review and yet less severe than the entire fairness standard. Moreover, the
defendants themselves are allocated the burden to show that they acted
reasonably.”).
26. This article puts to the side the issue of whether a CEO or other senior
manager qualifies for similar deference. Compare A. Gilchrist Sparks, III &
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law Duties of Non-Director Corporate Officers,
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the standard of review by examining to what degree a qualified
decision maker exists at either or both levels.
A.

From the Business Judgment Rule, to Entire Fairness, and Back Again

For a Delaware corporation, the DGCL designates the board of
directors as the primary corporate decision maker. Section 141(a)
provides that “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the
direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise
27
provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”
“The business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the
managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors under Section
28
141(a).”
The business judgment rule presumes that “in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
29
action taken was in the best interests of the company.” In other
words, the business judgment rule presumes that the board served
as a qualified decision maker, including that the directors were
independent, disinterested, appropriately informed, and acted for
a proper corporate purpose. “[T]he burden of pleading and proof
48 BUS. LAW. 215, 215 (1992), and Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks
III, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson,
60 BUS. LAW. 865, 865 (2005), with Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the
Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 456 (2005).
27. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West, Westlaw through 79 Laws 2014).
28. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). In Brehm v. Eisner,
746 A.2d 244, 253–54 (Del. 2000), the Delaware Supreme Court overruled seven
precedents, including Aronson, to the extent they reviewed a Rule 23.1 decision by
the Delaware Court of Chancery under an abuse of discretion standard or
otherwise suggested deferential appellate review. Id. at 253 n.13 (overruling in
part on this issue Scattered Corp. v. Chi. Stock Exch., 701 A.2d 70, 72–73
(Del. 1997); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1217 n.15 (Del. 1996); Heineman v.
Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 952 (Del. 1992); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194,
207 (Del. 1991); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186 (Del. 1988); Pogostin v. Rice,
480 A.2d 619, 624–25 (Del. 1984); Aronson, 471 A.2d at 814). The Brehm court held
that appellate review of a Rule 23.1 determination would be de novo and plenary.
746 A.2d at 253. The seven partially overruled precedents otherwise remain good
law. This article does not rely on any of them for the standard of appellate review
and, therefore, omits the cumbersome subsequent history.
29. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (citing Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119,
124 (Del. Ch. 1971); Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Refinery Corp., 126 A. 46 (Del.
Ch. 1924)).
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is on the party challenging the decision to allege facts to rebut the
30
presumption.” Each element of the business judgment rule has its
own test.
To rebut the business judgment rule’s presumption of care, a
31
plaintiff must plead and later prove gross negligence. When
considering whether a lack of care is sufficient to rebut the business
judgment rule, “[c]ourts do not measure, weigh or quantify
directors’ judgments. We do not even decide if they are reasonable
in this context. Due care in the decisionmaking context is process
32
due care only.”
To show a lack of disinterestedness sufficient to rebut the
business judgment rule, a plaintiff must plead and later prove that
a director received “a personal financial benefit from a transaction
33
that is not equally shared by the stockholders.” A plaintiff also can
show that a director has a compromising interest by pleading and
later proving that the director is a dual fiduciary and owes a
competing duty of loyalty to an entity that itself stands on the other
side of the transaction or that will receive a unique benefit not
34
shared with the stockholders. To show a lack of independence, a
30. Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1111–12 (Del. Ch. 1999) (citing
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812), aff’d, 746 A.2d 277 (Del. 2000).
31. See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 259.
32. Id. at 264.
33. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993) (citations omitted);
accord Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor Plenary II), 634 A.2d 345, 362
(Del. 1993) (“Classic examples of director self-interest in a business transaction
involve either a director appearing on both sides of a transaction or a director
receiving a personal benefit from a transaction not received by the shareholders
generally.”); Pogostin, 480 A.2d at 624 (“Directorial interest exists whenever . . . a
director either has received, or is entitled to receive, a personal financial benefit
from the challenged transaction which is not equally shared by the
stockholders.”). “[A] subjective ‘actual person’ standard [is used] to determine
whether a ‘given’ director was likely to be affected in the same or similar
circumstances.” McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 923 (Del. 2000) (citing
Technicolor Plenary IV, 663 A.2d 1156, 1167 (Del. 1995)).
[T]he benefit received by the director and not shared with
stockholders must be “of a sufficiently material importance, in the
context of the director’s economic circumstances, as to have made it
improbable that the director could perform her fiduciary duties . . .
without being influenced by her overriding personal interest.”
Trados I, Civ. A. No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009)
(quoting In re Gen. Motors Class H S’holders Litig., 734 A.2d 611, 617 (Del. Ch.
1999)).
34. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (holding that
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plaintiff must show that a director is sufficiently loyal to, beholden
to, or otherwise influenced by an interested party to undermine the
35
director’s ability to judge the matter on its merits.
A plaintiff also may seek to rebut the presumption that a
director acted subjectively for the proper corporate purpose of
serving the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders.
officers of parent corporation faced conflict of interest when acting as subsidiary
directors regarding transaction with parent); accord Sealy Mattress Co. of N.J. v.
Sealy, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324, 1336 (Del. Ch. 1987) (same); see also Trados I, 2009
WL 2225958, at *8 (treating directors as interested for pleading purposes in
transaction that benefited preferred stockholders when “each had an ownership
or employment relationship with an entity that owned Trados preferred stock”).
35. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815 (stating that one way to allege successfully that
an individual director is under the control of another is by pleading “such facts as
would demonstrate that through personal or other relationships the directors are
beholden to the controlling person”); Friedman v. Beningson, Civ. A. No. 12232,
1995 WL 716762, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1995) (“The requirement that directors
exercise independent judgment, (insofar as it is a distinct prerequisite to business judgment
review from a requirement that directors exercise financially disinterested judgment), directs
a court to an inquiry into all of the circumstances that are alleged to have
inappropriately affected the exercise of board power. This inquiry may include the
subject whether some or all directors are ‘beholden’ to or under the control,
domination or strong influence of a party with a material financial interest in the
transaction under attack, which interest is adverse to that of the corporation.”).
Classic examples involve familial relationships, such as a parent’s love for and
loyalty to a child. See, e.g., Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 889
(Del. Ch. 1999) (“That Hudson also happens to be Huizenga’s brother-in-law
makes me incredulous about Hudson’s impartiality. Close familial relationships
between directors can create a reasonable doubt as to impartiality. The plaintiff
bears no burden to plead facts demonstrating that directors who are closely
related have no history of discord or enmity that renders the natural inference of
mutual loyalty and affection unreasonable.”); Chaffin v. GNI Grp., Civ. A.
No. 16211-NC, 1999 WL 721569, at *5 (Del. Ch. Sept. 3, 1999) (holding that
father-son relationship was sufficient to rebut presumption of independence and
observing that “[i]nherent in the parental relationship is the parent’s natural
desire to help his or her child succeed” and “most parents would find it highly
difficult, if not impossible, to maintain a completely neutral, disinterested position
on an issue, where his or her own child would benefit substantially if the parent
decides the issue a certain way”); see also London v. Tyrrell, Civ. A. No. 3321-CC,
2010 WL 877528, at *14 n.60 (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2010) (“[I]n the pre-suit demand
context, plaintiffs can often meet their burden of establishing a lack of
independence with a simple allegation of a familial relationship. Surely then . . . it
will be nigh unto impossible for a corporation bearing the burden of proof to
demonstrate that an SLC member is independent in the face of plaintiffs’
allegation that the SLC member and a director defendant have a family
relationship.”).
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“[T]he duty of loyalty mandates that the best interest of the
corporation and its shareholders takes precedence over any interest
possessed by a director, officer or controlling shareholder and not
36
shared by the stockholders generally.” The presumption of good
faith can be rebutted by a showing that the directors failed to
37
pursue the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders.
Bad faith, which is a subsidiary element of the fiduciary duty of
38
loyalty, encompasses both “an intent to harm but also intentional
39
dereliction of duty.”
“A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance,
where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than
40
that of advancing the best interests of the corporation . . . .”
36. Technicolor Plenary II, 634 A.2d at 361.
37. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 907 A.2d 693, 760–79
(Del. Ch. 2005) (conducting a director-by-director analysis to determine if the
individual members of the board, none of whom were directly interested in the
hiring or termination of corporation’s President, acted in bad faith), aff’d,
906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); see also Disney II, 906 A.2d at 53 (“Our law clearly permits
a judicial assessment of director good faith for that former purpose [of rebutting
the business judgment rule].”); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16
A.3d 1, 40 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Under Delaware law, when a plaintiff demonstrates
the directors made a challenged decision in bad faith, the plaintiff rebuts the
business judgment rule presumption, and the burden shifts to the directors to
prove that the decision was entirely fair to the corporation and its stockholders.”).
38. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del.
2006).
39. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 240 (Del. 2009); accord
Disney II, 906 A.2d at 64–66 (defining “subjective bad faith” as “conduct motivated
by an actual intent to do harm,” which “constitutes classic, quintessential bad
faith,” and “intentional dereliction of duty” as “a conscious disregard for one’s
responsibilities”); see also Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (holding, in the context of an
oversight claim, that “utter[] fail[ure] to implement any reporting or information
system or controls,” or “having implemented such a system or controls,
conscious[] fail[ure] to monitor or oversee its operations” demonstrated “a
conscious disregard” for their fiduciary responsibilities).
40. Disney II, 906 A.2d at 67; accord Stone, 911 A.2d at 369 (“A failure to act in
good faith may be shown, for instance, where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a
purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation . . . .”);
see also Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.2 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(defining a “bad faith” transaction as one “that is authorized for some purpose
other than a genuine attempt to advance corporate welfare or is known to
constitute a violation of applicable positive law” (emphasis omitted)); In re RJR
Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 10389, 1989 WL 7036, at *1159 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 31, 1989) (explaining that the business judgment rule would not protect “a
fiduciary who could be shown to have caused a transaction to be effectuated (even
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“It makes no difference the reason why the director intentionally
41
fails to pursue the best interests of the corporation.” Bad faith can
be the result of “any . . . emotion [that] may cause a director to
[intentionally] place his own interests, preferences or appetites
before the welfare of the corporation,” including greed, “hatred,
42
lust, envy, revenge, . . . shame or pride.”
To change the standard of review from the business judgment
rule to entire fairness, a plaintiff must show that there were not
enough independent, disinterested, and sufficiently informed
individuals who acted in good faith when making the challenged
43
decision to constitute a board majority. If a board is evenly divided
between compromised and noncompromised directors, then the
44
plaintiff has succeeded in rebutting the business judgment rule.
In selecting a majority as the requisite number, the Delaware
Supreme Court recognized that it had to draw a line and made a
45
conscious policy decision. It is, therefore, not sufficient for a
46
plaintiff to show that a minority of the board was compromised.
one in which he had no financial interest) for a reason unrelated to a pursuit of
the corporation’s best interests”).
41. Disney I, 907 A.2d at 754; see Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 48 n.2
(Del. Ch. 2000) (finding that “regardless of his motive, a director who consciously
disregards his duties to the corporation and its stockholders may suffer a personal
judgment for monetary damages for any harm he causes,” even if for a reason
“other than personal pecuniary interest”).
42. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 1989 WL 7036, at *1159; see Guttman v. Huang,
823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“The reason for the disloyalty (the
faithlessness) is irrelevant, the underlying motive (be it venal, familial, collegial, or
nihilistic) for conscious action not in the corporation’s best interest does not make
it faithful, as opposed to faithless.”).
43. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (noting that if “the
transaction is not approved by a majority consisting of the disinterested directors,
then the business judgment rule has no application”).
44. See Gentile v. Rossette, Civ. A. No. 20213-VCN, 2010 WL 2171613, at *7
n.36 (Del. Ch. May 28, 2010) (“A board that is evenly divided between conflicted
and non-conflicted members is not considered independent and disinterested.”);
see also Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d
1040, 1046 n.8 (Del. 2004) (noting for demand futility purposes that a board
evenly divided between interested and disinterested directors could not exercise
business judgment on a demand); Beneville v. York, 769 A.2d 80, 85 (Del. Ch.
2000) (same).
45. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815 n.8 (“We recognize that drawing the line at a
majority of the board may be an arguably arbitrary dividing point.”).
46. The exception is where a minority of the directors faces a material
conflict of interest or other loyalty issue and fail to disclose their compromised
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Consequently, to determine whether to escalate from the
47
business judgment rule to entire fairness, a court counts heads. If
a director-by-director analysis leaves insufficient directors to make
up a board majority, then the board cannot act as the qualified
decision maker, and the court will review the board’s decision for
entire fairness. To reverse that process and reestablish the business
judgment rule, the defendants must show that despite the failures
identified by the plaintiff, there actually was a qualified decision
maker, such as a board committee or the fully informed
stockholders.
If a board of directors lacks an independent and disinterested
majority, then the standard of review will de-escalate from entire
fairness if the board exercised its authority under section 141(c) to
empower a committee of independent and disinterested directors
48
to make the relevant decision. If the board delegates its full power
to address an issue to a committee, then the judicial search for a
qualified decision maker shifts from the board to the committee.
The same principles that govern the inquiry at the board level
apply at the committee level, and the court will determine whether
there were sufficient directors who voted in favor of the decision to
make up a disinterested, independent, and informed majority of
the committee. So long as the board has not retained some residual
approval right or otherwise limited the committee’s authority, in
which case the board’s retention of a portion of its authority
undermines the committee’s ability to decide the issue and keeps
the judicial focus on the board, then a decision made by a
disinterested, independent, and informed majority of the
49
committee receives business judgment deference.
status to the other directors. See Technicolor Plenary IV, 663 A.2d 1156, 1168
(Del. 1995). Under those circumstances, the other directors are not able to take
into account the directors’ conflicted status and become compromised themselves
because they are not sufficiently informed.
47. See Technicolor Plenary II, 634 A.2d 345, 361, 364 (Del. 1993) (requiring
director-by-director analysis); Disney II, 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006) (affirming
director-by-director analysis); cf. Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 25 n.50 (Del. Ch.
2002) (explaining that materiality is required for a breach of fiduciary duty claim
but not for a violation of section 144 of the DGCL).
48. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (West, Westlaw through 79 Laws
2014); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813; see also Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 467
(Del. 1991) (“The key to upholding an interested transaction is the approval of
some neutral decision-making body.”).
49. See In re W. Nat’l Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 15927, 2000 WL 710192,
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More importantly for present purposes, a compromised board
can substitute the stockholders as the necessary qualified decision
maker and, thereby, restore the protections of the business
judgment rule. This alternative does not imply that an up-or-down
vote by stockholders is the functional equivalent of the careful,
deliberative investigation into and weighing of alternatives that
should be the hallmarks of a board’s decision-making process.
Rather, it recognizes that the stockholders collectively are wellpositioned to decide whether to endorse what the board did, and
that for purposes of determining how easy it should be for a
stockholder plaintiff to challenge the action taken by the board
(i.e., to determine the standard of review), a court should take into
account and defer to an uncoerced endorsement from fully
50
informed, disinterested stockholders.
There is also an important caveat as to the legal implications of
stockholder approval, which can have a variety of effects. A
stockholder vote can validate an insufficiently authorized act that
51
otherwise would be voidable. It also provides one of the statutory
at *27 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2000); see also Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 696
(Del. Ch. 1971).
50. There is a gut-level sense of fairness to this result. If the fully informed
stockholders conclude collectively that they want an outcome, why should selfappointed stockholder plaintiffs be able to seek to hold directors liable for a
decision that a majority of the stockholders endorsed? Absent disclosure violations
or coercion, there is something contradictory about stockholders collectively
saying, “Yes, I want this merger” and then for the stockholder plaintiffs to seek
damages from the directors for having approved the deal and recommended it to
the stockholders in the first place. An alternative means of addressing this concern
would be to exclude consenting stockholders from the class, but that approach
would be inconsistent with the democratic concept of majority rule. Rather than
the stockholder vote acting as a vote, it would operate as a class action opt-out
mechanism. To give effect to the vote qua vote (i.e., as a mechanism for
democratic decision making), the vote must also have some effect on the
dissenters. My thanks go to David McBride for raising these points.
51. Under Delaware law, insufficiently authorized acts can be either void or
voidable. A void act is an action that is beyond the power of the corporation under
any circumstances. See Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 218–19 (Del. 1979)
(distinguishing between void and voidable acts); Solomon v. Armstrong, 747
A.2d 1098, 1114 (Del. Ch. 1999) (“Void acts are those acts that the board, or more
generally the corporation, has no implicit or explicit authority to undertake or
those acts that are fundamentally contrary to public policy.”). A voidable act is one
that the corporation as an entity has the power to accomplish, but which the
decision maker approving the transaction lacked the power to effectuate under
the corporation’s bylaws, certificate of incorporation, or the DGCL. See Harbor
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safe harbors established by section 144 of the DGCL. And even
when the subject matter is limited to the standard of review for a
fiduciary challenge, stockholder approval can have different
consequences depending on pertinent factors, such as whether the
underlying claim alleges a breach of the duty of loyalty or care, and
whether the corporation has a controlling stockholder or de facto
53
controller. Cases have also touched on the key difference
addressed here: whether there should be a distinction between an
organic vote and a voluntary vote.
But what has never been disputed is the effectiveness of socalled “classic” ratification in defeating a stockholder plaintiff’s

Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 896 (Del. Ch. 1999) (explaining that
voidable acts are ones that “the corporation can lawfully accomplish . . . if it does
so in the appropriate manner”). “The practical distinction, for our purposes, is
that voidable acts are susceptible to cure by [majority] shareholder approval while
void acts are not.” Michelson, 407 A.2d at 219. I have added the word “majority” to
the quotation from Michelson because it is customarily said (and the Michelson
decision later noted) that certain categories of void acts, such as waste or matters
that are ultra vires, can be approved by unanimous stockholder vote. See id. (“It is
only where a claim of gift or waste of assets, fraud or [u]ltra vires is asserted that a
less than unanimous shareholder ratification is not a full defense.”). To my mind,
the latter is more akin to universal acquiescence by all possible stockholder
plaintiffs. The act remains void, but there is no one left to challenge it.
52. At common law, an interested transaction between the corporation and
one of its directors or officers was voidable. Blake Rohrbacher et al., Finding Safe
Harbor: Clarifying the Limited Application of Section 144, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 719
(2008). Section 144 was adopted to “rescue” such transactions “from per se
voidability under the common law.” Id. at 720. Section 144 deals solely with the
“problem of per se invalidity; that is, as addressing only the common law principle
that interested transactions were entirely invalid and providing a road map for
transactional planners to avoid that fate.” In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders
Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 614–15 (Del. Ch. 2005). The separate determination of “when
an interested transaction might give rise to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty—
i.e., to a claim in equity—was left to the common law of corporations to answer.”
Id. at 615. Notwithstanding its narrow purpose, and likely because approval by
disinterested and independent directors, or by disinterested and independent
stockholders, can be relevant to the common law fiduciary duty analysis, section
144 has “been misconstrued to provide business-judgment protection to
transactions complying with its terms.” Rohrbacher, supra, at 746; see also id.
at 741–46 (discussing cases interpreting section 144 beyond its limited scope).
This overextension of section 144 is problematic because the standards for
director approval and stockholder ratification under section 144 differ from the
common law of fiduciary duty. See id. at 737–39.
53. See infra Part III.
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54

claim for breach of fiduciary duty. If the board makes a business
decision on an issue within its authority and submits the matter to
the stockholders for a voluntary vote, and if the stockholder vote is
fully informed and noncoerced, then the resulting stockholder
approval not only causes the business judgment rule to protect the
board’s decision, but also has the additional effect of barring a
stockholder plaintiff from seeking to rebut the presumptions of the
55
business judgment rule. Under those circumstances, a court only
will look to whether the decision served some rational business
purpose, and because the stockholders already have approved it, a
plaintiff will find it difficult to convince a court that no rational
56
person could agree with the board’s judgment. In those
circumstances, the stockholders collectively function as the
57
qualified decision maker to which the reviewing court defers.
54. See In re Wheelabrator Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig. (Wheelabrator II),
663 A.2d 1194, 1200 (Del. Ch. 1995).
55. See id. at 1200 (holding that “(1) the effect of the informed shareholder
vote was to extinguish the plaintiffs’ due care claim; (2) that vote did not operate
either to extinguish the duty of loyalty claim (as defendants contend), or to shift
to the plaintiffs the burden of proving that the merger was unfair (as plaintiffs
contend); and (3) the effect of the shareholder vote in this case is to invoke the
business judgment standard, which limits review to issues of gift or waste with the
burden of proof resting upon the plaintiffs”).
56. See Harbor Fin. Partners, 751 A.2d at 895, 901 (questioning “the vestigial
right to prove that a transaction that a majority of fully informed, uncoerced
independent stockholders approved by a non-unanimous vote was wasteful” and
offering several convincing reasons that the doctrine has lost its utility, including
the difficulty of “prov[ing] a waste or gift claim in the face of a decision by fully
informed, uncoerced, independent stockholders to ratify the transaction,” given
that “[t]he test for waste is whether any person of ordinary sound business
judgment could view the transaction as fair”); Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 612
(Del. Ch. 1962) (observing that stockholder vote approving transaction was
“[s]urely . . . some indication” that terms of transaction were reasonable).
57. This article discusses the concept of stockholder approval in terms of a
stockholder vote, which is the typical context in which the issue arises.
Stockholders also can consent to a transaction by tendering their shares.
See Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 842 (Del. 1987) (equating the
act of “vot[ing] in favor of a merger” with tendering and “accept[ing] the benefits
of the transaction”). If the first-step tender offer in a two-step transaction is
conditioned on tenders of a majority of the outstanding shares, and if sufficient
stockholders tender to satisfy the condition, then it should have the same effect as
an affirmative stockholder vote. See In re Orchid Cellmark Inc. S’holder Litig., Civ.
A. No. 6373-VCN, 2011 WL 1938253, at *13 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2011) (“Tendering,
of course, is a substitute for shareholder vote.”); Matador Capital Mgmt. Corp. v.
BRC Holdings, Inc., 729 A.2d 280, 294 (Del. Ch. 1998) (recognizing that
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The Special Case of a Controlling Stockholder

The Delaware Supreme Court has recognized a situationspecific exception to the general principle that the business
judgment rule is rebutted by counting heads to determine if a
qualified board majority exists. If the challenged transaction
confers a unique benefit on a majority stockholder or other party
that exercises de facto control over the corporation, then that
58
decisional context triggers “the entire fairness standard ab initio.”
The presence of a controller creates a special case because the
controller’s influence operates at both the board and stockholder
levels. It is not uncommon for a controller to nominate a majority
of the corporation’s directors. Agents, employees, and other
fiduciaries of the controller, who serve on the corporation’s board,
face a conflict of interest arising from their respective dual
59
fiduciary statuses. The controller’s influence also undercuts the
independence of otherwise independent and disinterested
directors, because the controller has the power to determine
60
whether those individuals will remain directors. At the stockholder level, the controller can simply dictate the outcome of a
61
vote.
stockholders were, as a practical matter, “being asked to decide to approve the sale
of their corporation as a part of their decision whether or not to tender shares in
the first-step tender offer”).
58. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 93 (Del. 2001); accord Kahn v.
Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994).
59. See generally Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983);
Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 58 (Del. 1952).
60. See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1116 (“[I]n a merger between the corporation and
its controlling stockholder—even one negotiated by disinterested, independent
directors—no court could be certain whether the transaction terms fully
approximate what truly independent parties would have achieved in an arm’s
length negotiation.”). But see Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815–16 (Del. 1984)
(presuming that independent directors are capable of exercising a disinterested
business judgment in deciding whether to cause the company to sue a controlling
stockholder).
61. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42–43
(Del. 1993) (“[S]tockholder votes are likely to become mere formalities where
there is a majority stockholder. For example, minority stockholders can be
deprived of a continuing equity interest in their corporation by means of a cashout merger. Absent effective protective provisions, minority stockholders must rely
for protection solely on the fiduciary duties owed to them by the directors and the
majority stockholder, since the minority stockholders have lost the power to
influence corporate direction through the ballot.” (citing Weinberger, 457 A.2d
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Because the controller’s influence operates at both the board
and stockholder levels, neither a special committee nor a majorityof-the-minority vote, standing alone, is sufficient to sterilize the
controller’s influence and reestablish the presence of a qualified
decision maker. A special committee alone is not sufficient because
of the controller’s influence over the members of the committee,
whom the controller can remove using its stockholder-level
authority. The controller also has special negotiating advantages,
such as the ability to obtain information about the corporation
through its agents and employees on the board or simply through
its status as a dominant stockholder, the opportunity to time any
transactional proposal advantageously, and the power to use its
stockholder voting power or other rights to veto transactional
62
alternatives to the controller’s chosen transaction. If push comes
to shove, the controller has the ability to neutralize or bypass the
committee by using its board majority to push the transaction
63
through or by taking a transaction directly to the stockholders.
An independent stockholder vote, implemented through, for
example, a condition that a transaction with the controller be
approved by a majority of the unaffiliated minority stockholders, is
also not sufficient. The Delaware Supreme Court has held that

at 703)).
62. See, e.g., Rabkin v. Phillip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1103,
1107 (Del. 1985) (permitting fairness challenge to merger based on controller’s
allegedly unfair manipulation of the timing of the transaction); Weinberger,
457 A.2d at 711 (noting that factors affecting fairness include “questions of when
the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to
the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were
obtained”); In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 617 (Del. Ch.
2005) (positing that the entire fairness standard for controlling stockholder
transactions rests on “a sincere concern that mergers with controlling stockholders
involve an extraordinary potential for the exploitation by powerful insiders of
their informational advantages and their voting clout”).
63. See, e.g., Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1118 (noting that the controller threatened
“to proceed with an unfriendly tender offer at a lower price” if the committee did
not agree to a negotiated transaction); In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., Civ. A.
No. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *3–4 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2001) (noting that
controller made no-premium exchange offer after failing to reach agreement with
special committee over premium cash offer); see also In re Ocean Drilling &
Exploration Co. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 11898, 1991 WL 70028, at *5 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 30, 1991) (noting that special committee rejected merger proposal as
unfair, and controller later proceeded with unilateral two-step freeze out that
special committee recommended against in this pre-Kahn case).
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minority stockholders face a threat of implicit coercion when
voting on a controlling stockholder’s proposal such that they
cannot act freely and independently in the face of the controller:
Parent subsidiary mergers . . . are proposed by a party
that controls, and will continue to control, the
corporation, whether or not the minority stockholders
vote to approve or reject the transaction. The controlling
stockholder relationship has the potential to influence,
however subtly, the . . . minority stockholders in a manner
that is not likely to occur in a transaction with a
noncontrolling party.
Even where no coercion is intended, shareholders . . . might perceive that their disapproval could
risk retaliation of some kind by the controlling
stockholder. For example, the controlling stockholder
might decide to stop dividend payments or to effect a
subsequent cash out merger at a less favorable price, for
which the remedy would be time consuming and costly
litigation. At the very least, the potential for that
perception, and its possible impact upon a shareholder
64
vote, could never be fully eliminated.
Even accepting that the minority stockholders can reject a
controller’s proposal, collective action problems prevent diffuse
minority stockholders from bargaining affirmatively for better
65
terms.
The Delaware Supreme Court has recognized that using either
a special committee or a majority-of-the-minority vote provides
some procedural protections and, therefore, warrants some change
in the standard of review. But the high court has held that using
only one of the protections will not restore the business judgment
rule. Rather, the effect of using only one such device is to shift the
burden of proof on the issue of fairness so that, instead of the
defendants having to prove fairness, the plaintiffs have to prove
66
unfairness.

64. Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1116 (quoting Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 584 A.2d 490, 502 (Del. Ch. 1990)).
65. Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 618 (“The active agency of centralized
management to test the market and bargain is not something that the
stockholders can do for themselves.”).
66. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1382 (Del. 1996) (citing Rosenblatt v.
Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985)); see Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1116–17.
Recent case law has minimized the importance of the burden shift. See, e.g., Ams.
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To reestablish the presence of a sufficiently qualified decision
maker to restore business judgment deference, the controller must
take affirmative steps, at the outset of the transaction process, to
remove the potential taint at both the board and the stockholder
levels. This requires that the transaction be both (1) negotiated
and approved by a fully authorized special committee of
independent directors and (2) conditioned on an affirmative vote
of a majority of the minority stockholders. If the transaction
incorporates both protections from the outset, then the business
67
judgment standard of review presumptively applies.
This
combination of requirements is designed “to mirror both elements
of an arms’ length merger, viz. approval by disinterested directors
68
and approval by disinterested stockholders.” “If the transaction
does not incorporate both protective devices, or if a plaintiff can
plead particularized facts sufficient to raise a litigable question
about the effectiveness of one of the devices, then the transaction
69
[remains] subject to entire fairness review.”
C.

Moving In and Out of Enhanced Scrutiny

Enhanced scrutiny, Delaware’s intermediate standard of
review, is triggered by specific, readily identifiable situations in
which the realities of the decision-making context can subtly
undermine the decisions of even independent and disinterested
directors. The Delaware Supreme Court first recognized the need
for enhanced scrutiny in situations when a board resists a hostile
takeover. In that scenario, there is an “omnipresent specter” that
Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1243 (Del. 2012) (“The failure to shift
the burden is not outcome determinative under the entire fairness standard of
review. . . . [T]he only ‘modest’ effect of the burden shift is to make the plaintiff
prove unfairness under a preponderance of the evidence standard . . . .”). An
alternative approach that could further harmonize and simplify Delaware law
would be for the Delaware Supreme Court to hold that using a single protective
device lowers the standard of review one step from entire fairness to enhanced
scrutiny, with the burden of proof remaining on the defendants to show that they
achieved an outcome falling within a range of reasonableness. Using two
protective devices would continue to lower the standard of review two steps from
entire fairness to the business judgment rule.
67. In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 502 (Del. Ch. 2013), aff’d,
– A.3d –, 2014 WL 996270 (Del. Mar. 14, 2014); In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders
Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 412–13 (Del. Ch. 2010) (citing Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 606).
68. CNX Gas, 4 A.3d at 412 (citing Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 606).
69. Id. at 413 (citing Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 606).
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target directors may be influenced by and act to further their own
interests or those of incumbent management, “rather than those of
70
the corporation and its shareholders.”
Directors facing a proxy contest have a similar positional
conflict.
A candidate for office, whether as an elected official or as
a director of a corporation, is likely to prefer to be elected
rather than defeated. He therefore has a personal interest
in the outcome of the election even if the interest is not
71
financial and he seeks to serve from the best of motives.
Enhanced scrutiny also applies in other situations where the law
provides stockholders with a right to vote and the directors take
action that intrudes on the space allotted for stockholder decision
72
making.
Final-stage transactions for stockholders provide another
73
situation where enhanced scrutiny applies. Final-stage transactions
give rise to what economists refer to as the last period problem.
Simply put, in a situation where parties expect to have
repeated transactions, the recognition that a party who
cheats in one transaction will be penalized by the other
party in subsequent transactions reduces the incentive to
cheat. However, when a transaction is the last (or only) in
a series—that is, the final period—the incentive to cheat
reappears because, by definition, the penalty for doing so
74
has disappeared.
In the corporate context, the ability of managers to shirk or
self-deal ordinarily is constrained not only by legal duties but also
by a range of markets, including the product markets, capital
70. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
71. Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1206 (Del. Ch. 1987).
72. See Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 804–10 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(discussing the application of enhanced scrutiny to board action affecting
stockholder voting); State of Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., Civ. A. No. 17637,
2000 WL 1805376, at *10–11 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000) (applying enhanced scrutiny
to meeting adjournment that kept polls open for vote on increasing shares
allocated to stock option plan).
73. See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 918 (Del. 2000); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
74. RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 720 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995). See
generally Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play,
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1942–53 (2003) (describing divergence of interests
resulting from the last period problem).
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markets, employment markets, and the market for corporate
control. But when managers are in their final period, market
consequences have less traction, making managers more likely to
favor their own interests. In connection with a final-stage
transaction,
the target corporation’s board and management may
demand side payments from the acquiror, thus effectively
diverting a portion of the merger consideration from the
shareholders to the management team. If the management team is able to protect the self-serving transaction
with deal protection provisions, it will be further insulated
from the disciplinary effect of the market for corporate
control, leaving the outgoing management team free to
serve their own self-interest with relative impunity.
In addition to the unrestrained pursuit of their own
self-interest, directors and managers in the last period
may depart from the best interests of the corporation and
its shareholders due to a variety of non-pecuniary, but
equally selfish, motivations. Directors and managers may
favor one deal over another because it is more in line with
their self image and view of the world or because it is
more likely to cause them to be remembered fondly by
75
employees or the business press.
The Delaware courts have held that at least three types of finalstage transactions carry the risk of subtle conflicts warranting
enhanced scrutiny: “a cash sale, a break-up, or a transaction like a
76
change of control that fundamentally alters ownership rights.”
The Delaware Supreme Court also has held that the defensive
aspects of a stock-for-stock merger agreement warrant enhanced
77
scrutiny.
Only one Delaware Court of Chancery decision has held that
an organic vote on a merger lowers the standard of review from
78
enhanced scrutiny to the business judgment rule. Nevertheless, as

75. Griffith, supra note 74, at 1947.
76. See, e.g., Lonergan v. EPE Holdings L.L.C., 5 A.3d 1008, 1019 (Del. Ch.
2010).
77. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 934–36
(Del. 2003) (applying enhanced scrutiny to deal protection devices).
78. In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 736–38 (Del. Ch. 1999)
(holding that fully informed stockholder vote on a merger triggered business
judgment standard of review resulting in dismissal of claim that the directors of a
corporation breached their duty of care in selling the corporation).
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a matter of first principles, this makes sense. The stockholder
collective functions as a qualified decision maker to which a court
applying Delaware law should give deference. Nor should it matter
whether the vote is voluntary or organic. As discussed, an organic
vote lowers the standard of review from entire fairness to the
business judgment rule when the corporation does not have a
79
controlling stockholder or de facto controller. An organic vote
should have the same effect for enhanced scrutiny, which is a less
intrusive, intermediate standard of review.
The Delaware Supreme Court precedent that most strongly
80
supports this view is Stroud v. Grace. The Stroud decision involved a
family-owned, privately held Delaware corporation, Milliken
81
Enterprises, Inc. Two different family factions had competing
visions for Milliken. A faction that controlled a majority of the
corporation’s outstanding voting power proposed a package of
charter and bylaw amendments that, among other things, imposed
qualifications for service as a director and advanced notice
82
requirements for stockholder-nominated candidates. Nine of
Milliken’s ten directors, including five out of six outside directors
83
(unaffiliated with either faction) approved the amendments. At
the Milliken annual meeting, 97.8% of the shares entitled to vote
were present, and 78.0% of the outstanding shares approved the
84
amendments. The minority faction—the Strouds—challenged the
amendments, contending that they should be reviewed under the
enhanced scrutiny test and that the board had breached its

79. See Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 890 (Del. Ch. 1999);
Cole v. Nat’l Cash Credit Ass’n, 156 A. 183, 187 (Del. Ch. 1931) (“As long as ‘[the
directors] act in good faith, with honest motives, for honest ends,’ the exercise of
their discretion will not be interfered with. . . . The same presumption of fairness
that supports the discretionary judgment of the managing directors must also be
accorded to the majority of stockholders whenever they are called upon to speak
for the corporation in matters assigned to them for decision, as is the case at one
stage of the proceedings leading up to a sale of assets or a merger.” (citation
omitted)).
80. 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992).
81. Id. at 79.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 80.
84. Id. at 80–81.
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85

fiduciary duties. The Delaware Court of Chancery granted
86
summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the
Delaware Court of Chancery’s holding that enhanced scrutiny did
not apply. In doing so, the Delaware Supreme Court gave
dispositive effect to the stockholder vote. As the high court
explained, “[i]nherent in [enhanced scrutiny] is a presumption
that a board acted in the absence of an informed shareholder vote
87
ratifying the challenged action.” Importantly, for mergers that are
subject to enhanced scrutiny, the stockholder vote that the
Delaware Supreme Court held dispositive in Stroud was required by
88
section 242 of the DGCL. The fact that section 242 required both
prior board approval and subsequent stockholder approval did not
89
alter the effect of the vote on the standard of review.
90
Further support for this view can be found in Williams v. Geier,
where the Delaware Supreme Court explained the importance of
the organic vote on a charter amendment:
Like the statutory scheme relating to mergers under 8
Del.C. § 251, it is significant that two discrete corporate
events must occur, in precise sequence, to amend the
certificate of incorporation under 8 Del.C. § 242: First, the
board of directors must adopt a resolution declaring the

85. Id. at 81.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 83.
88. Id. at 85.
89. Id. at 83–84. Although enhanced scrutiny did not apply because of the
stockholder vote, the Delaware Supreme Court treated the majority faction as a
controlling stockholder and proceeded to review the recapitalization for entire
fairness. Id. at 91. Consistent with other Delaware Supreme Court precedent, the
Stroud court held that the fully informed stockholder vote shifted the burden of
proving unfairness to the plaintiff. Id. at 90 (“Since there was no breach of any
fiduciary duty in connection with the shareholder vote at the 1989 annual
meeting, a fully informed majority of the shareholders adopted the Amendments
and effectively ratified the board’s action. This shifts the burden of proof to the
Strouds to prove that the transaction was unfair. They have utterly failed in that
regard.” (citing Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 846 (Del. 1987);
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 890 (Del. 1985); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983); Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224
(Del. 1979); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 58–59 (Del. 1952); Saxe
v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962); Gerlach v. Gillam, 139 A.2d 591, 593
(Del. Ch. 1958))).
90. 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996).
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advisability of the amendment and calling for a
stockholder vote. Second, a majority of the outstanding
stock entitled to vote must vote in favor. The stockholders
may not act without prior board action. Likewise, the
board may not act unilaterally without stockholder
approval. Therefore, the stockholders control their own
91
destiny through informed voting.
The supreme court described this procedure as “the highest and
92
best form of corporate democracy.” The Williams court did not
discount the quality of the vote because it was an organic
93
requirement of the DGCL.
As noted, the Delaware Court of Chancery has held on at least
one occasion that an organic vote on a merger reduces the
standard of review from enhanced scrutiny to the business
94
judgment rule. More commonly, the Delaware Court of Chancery
has simply deferred to the stockholder vote in situations where
enhanced scrutiny applies. Numerous decisions have given
deference to stockholder decision making when determining
whether to issue an injunction against a pending merger before the
95
stockholder vote has taken place. This is because
91. Id. at 1381.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 1380–81.
94. See In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 736–38 (Del. Ch.
1999) (holding that fully informed stockholder vote on a merger triggered
business judgment standard of review resulting in dismissal of claim that the
directors of a corporation breached their duty of care in selling the corporation).
95. See, e.g., In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder Litig., Civ. A. No. 7144-VCG,
2012 WL 729232, at *21 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012) (“Nonetheless, given that the
meritorious allegations discussed above are remediable by damages, I find it in the
best interests of the stockholders that they be given the opportunity to decide for
themselves whether the Merger negotiated by Rosenkranz and the Director
Defendants offers an acceptable price for their shares.”); In re El Paso Corp.
S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 434–35 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“Although the pursuit of a
monetary damages award may not be likely to promise full relief, the record does
not instill in me the confidence to deny, by grant of an injunction, El Paso’s
stockholders from accepting a transaction that they may find desirable in current
market conditions, despite the disturbing behavior that led to its final terms.”);
In re Cogent, Inc. S’holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 515 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“At the other
end of the spectrum, where a selling Board’s alleged Revlon violations occur in the
absence of another viable bid, this Court often finds injunctive relief to be
inappropriate because it would be imprudent to terminate the only deal available,
when the stockholders can make that decision for themselves.”); In re Dollar
Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 618 (Del. Ch. 2010) (ruling that balance of
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Delaware corporate law strives to give effect to business
decisions approved by properly motivated directors and
by informed, disinterested stockholders. By this means,
our law seeks to balance the interest in promoting fair
treatment of stockholders and the utility of avoiding
judicial inquiries into the wisdom of business decisions.
Thus, doctrines like ratification and acquiescence operate
to keep the judiciary from second-guessing transactions
when disinterested stockholders have had a fair
96
opportunity to protect themselves by voting no.
Conversely, where there is coercion or a disclosure deficiency, the
Delaware Court of Chancery will find irreparable harm and enjoin
97
a transaction. “By issuing an injunction requiring additional
harms tilted against injunction because stockholders could decide for themselves
to vote deal down and take the chance of receiving an actionable higher bid);
In re Netsmart Techs. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 208 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[W]hen
[the] court is asked to enjoin a transaction and another higher-priced alternative
is not immediately available, it has been appropriately modest about playing games
with other people’s [(i.e., the stockholders’)] money.”); In re Pennaco Energy
S’holders Litig., 787 A.2d 691, 715 (Del. Ch. 2001) (“After all, even when a
sufficient merits showing is made by a plaintiff, this court is justifiably reluctant to
enjoin a premium-generating transaction when no other option is available,
except insofar as is necessary for the disclosure of additional information to
permit stockholders to make an informed decision whether to tender.”).
96. Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 207.
97. See, e.g., Berger v. Pubco Corp., Civ. A. No. 3414-CC, 2008 WL 2224107,
at *4 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2008) (“A disclosure violation results in an irreparable
injury, which implicates the jurisdiction of this Court.”), rev’d on other grounds,
976 A.2d 132 (Del. 2009); Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 207 (“[T]his court has typically
found a threat of irreparable injury to exist when it appears stockholders may
make an important voting decision on inadequate disclosures.”); Allen v. News
Corp., Civ. A. No. 969-N, 2005 WL 415095, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 3, 2005) (“At this
early stage, plaintiffs have demonstrated a ‘sufficiently colorable claim’ that the
disclosures contained in News’ proxy materials are materially deficient or
misleading and that there is a ‘possibility of a threatened irreparable injury,’
namely the loss of the ability by the Fox shareholders to have all pertinent
information available at the time they decide whether to tender their shares into
the exchange offer, if expedition is not granted.” (quoting U.S. Surgical Corp. v.
Circon Corp., Civ. A. No. 15223, 1997 WL 33175025, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17,
1997))); In re MONY Grp. S’holder Litig., 852 A.2d 9, 18 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“This
disclosure violation threatens irreparable harm because stockholders may vote
‘yes’ on a transaction they otherwise would have voted ‘no’ on if they had access to
full or nonmisleading disclosures regarding the CICs.”); ODS Techs., L.P. v.
Marshall, 832 A.2d 1254, 1262 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“The threat of an [uninformed]
stockholder vote constitutes irreparable harm.”); In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders
Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 452 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“[I]rreparable injury is threatened when
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disclosure, the court gives stockholders the choice to think for
themselves on full information, thereby vindicating their rights as
stockholders to make important voting and remedial decisions
98
based on their own economic self-interest.” If stockholder voting
did not have any pertinence in situations where enhanced scrutiny
applies, it would be odd for judges to defer to the stockholder vote
or to insist that it be fully informed. Instead, in situations governed
by enhanced scrutiny, “Delaware corporation law gives great weight
99
to informed decisions made by an uncoerced electorate.” This
deference implicitly recognizes the stockholders as qualified
decision makers to which the court can defer.
Taken together, these authorities make a strong case in favor
of a stockholder vote lowering the standard of review from
enhanced scrutiny to the business judgment rule. The vote should
have this effect regardless of whether or not it is required by the
100
DGCL.
IV. POTENTIAL IMPEDIMENTS
The logical implications of a fully informed stockholder vote
encounter potential impediments in the Delaware Supreme Court’s
101
decisions in In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Litigation and
102
Gantler v. Stephens. If read broadly, Santa Fe appears to hold that
a stockholder might make a tender or voting decision on the basis of materially
misleading or inadequate information.”).
98. Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 207.
99. In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 114 (Del. Ch. 2007).
100. This article addresses only the doctrinal question of whether
stockholders can act as qualified decision makers for purposes of changing the
standard of review. It does not attempt to operationalize the doctrine by
articulating the requirements for stockholders to act as qualified decision makers,
such as whether the denominator should be the shares outstanding, versus only
those voting, or whether shares held by particular individuals or entities, such as
shares owned by the directors, should be excluded from the vote. See, e.g., In re
John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S’holder Litig., Civ. A. No. 758-CC, 2009 WL
3165613, at *12–13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009) (holding that majority-of-the-minority
vote that could be waived by a special committee and that required a majority of
the shares voting rather than the shares outstanding would not affect the standard
of review). At a minimum, the stockholder approval must be fully informed and
free of any coercion. See, e.g., In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 502
(Del. Ch. 2013), aff’d, – A.3d –, 2014 WL 996270 (Del. Mar. 14, 2014); Hammons
Hotels, 2009 WL 3165613, at *12 n.38.
101. 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995).
102. 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
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when enhanced scrutiny applies to a board decision, stockholder
approval is not sufficient to reduce the standard of review to the
business judgment rule, unless stockholders are given a specific,
unbundled vote on the defensive measures otherwise subject to
enhanced scrutiny. Gantler can be read as potentially limiting the
effect of stockholder approval even further. An aggressive
interpretation of Gantler might suggest that if a stockholder vote is
required organically by the DGCL, it cannot alter the standard of
review.
These readings of Santa Fe and Gantler ignore their placement
within a lengthy line of Delaware decisions that have attempted to
correct confusing language about ratification that appeared in
103
Smith v. Van Gorkom. The Delaware Supreme Court’s most recent
pronouncement in Gantler is best understood as rejecting earlier
loose usages of ratification and limiting that term to the effect of a
stockholder vote not otherwise required by the DGCL on a
104
voidable act. Gantler leaves open the possibility that stockholder
approval, even in the form of an organic vote required by the
DGCL, will reduce the standard of review from enhanced scrutiny
to the business judgment rule.
A.

Santa Fe

Santa Fe grew out of a battle for control of Santa Fe Industries,
a publicly traded Delaware corporation “with interests in railway
105
transportation and petroleum pipelines.” In June 1994, Santa Fe
entered into a merger agreement with Burlington Northern, Inc.,
another railroad company, that contemplated a stock-for-stock
106
merger between the two corporations. The original transaction
would have provided Santa Fe stockholders with Burlington stock
107
with a market value of approximately $13.50 per share. The
original merger agreement contained a force-the-vote provision
and did not permit Santa Fe to terminate the merger agreement to

103. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), overruled in part by
Gantler, 965 A.2d at 713 n.54.
104. Gantler, 965 A.2d at 713.
105. Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 63.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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accept a superior proposal, although the board could change its
108
merger recommendation.
Union Pacific Corporation then contacted Santa Fe and
109
proposed a combination of its own. The Union Pacific proposal
would have provided Santa Fe stockholders with Union Pacific
stock with a market value of approximately $18.00 per share, 33.0%
110
more than the Burlington proposal. The Santa Fe board rejected
the proposal because of inadequacy of price, antitrust concerns,
and the board’s determination that “Santa Fe was prevented by the
First Merger Agreement from considering the Union Pacific offer.
Santa Fe also refused to provide Union Pacific with non-public
111
information to assess the value of Santa Fe.” Santa Fe and
Burlington also responded by increasing the exchange ratio in
their merger agreement so that Santa Fe stockholders would
receive Burlington stock with a market value of approximately
112
$17.00 per share. Union Pacific countered by increasing its offer
to 0.407 shares of stock, worth approximately $20.00 per share, and
113
proposing to establish a voting trust to address the antitrust risk.
When Santa Fe continued to refuse to engage, Union Pacific
launched a cash tender offer for 57.1% of Santa Fe’s outstanding
shares at $17.50 per share, to be followed by a second-step merger
in which Santa Fe stockholders would receive 0.354 shares of Union
114
Pacific stock. Union Pacific also received preliminary approval for
115
its voting trust structure.
The Santa Fe board nevertheless
recommended that stockholders not tender their shares to Union
Pacific, and Santa Fe’s CEO advised Union Pacific that “Santa Fe
116
was not for sale.”
The Santa Fe board then adopted a rights plan with a 10.0%
117
trigger. Santa Fe and Burlington also amended their merger
agreement to (1) make the exchange ratio still more favorable to
Santa Fe; (2) pay a fifty million dollar termination fee to

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 64.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Burlington if Santa Fe accepted a higher offer; and (3) commence
a joint tender offer for up to 33.0% of Santa Fe’s common stock,
with Burlington purchasing up to 13.0% and Santa Fe up to 20.0%
118
of the Santa Fe shares. Burlington would own 16.0% of the
outstanding shares of Santa Fe if the joint offer were fully
119
completed.
Union Pacific again raised the price of its tender offer, this
120
time to $18.50 per share. The Santa Fe board again recommended against the offer, and Burlington and Santa Fe revised
their merger agreement to allow Santa Fe to purchase up to ten
121
million shares after the joint tender offer and before the merger.
Santa Fe also amended its rights plan to allow Allegheny
Corporation to purchase up to 14.9% of Santa Fe shares without
triggering the rights and announced that Allegheny had agreed to
122
vote in favor of the Santa Fe-Burlington merger. The proposed
Allegheny purchases, the joint tender offer, and the repurchase
program would place 33.0% of the shares of Santa Fe in the hands
123
of parties committed to the Burlington-Santa Fe merger.
Union Pacific and various Santa Fe stockholder plaintiffs sued
in the Delaware Court of Chancery to challenge the actions of the
124
Santa Fe board. The court of chancery twice declined to expedite
the proceedings, initially ruling that the challenge came too soon,
125
then subsequently ruling that the challenge came too late.
Stymied, Union Pacific withdrew its offer and dropped its lawsuit,
126
leaving the stockholder litigants as the only plaintiffs. After the
Santa Fe stockholders approved the merger, the plaintiffs amended
their complaint to allege that the Santa Fe board had breached its
fiduciary duties when reviewed under enhanced scrutiny and failed
127
to disclose all material facts in connection with the merger vote.

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 65.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Compare Union Pac. Corp. v. Santa Fe Pac. Corp., No. 13778, 1994
WL 586924 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 1994), with In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig.,
No. 13778, 1995 WL 54428 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 1995).
126. Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 65.
127. Id.
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The Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint as
128
failing to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The
court of chancery found that the fully informed stockholder vote
129
extinguished any claim that the board breached its duty of care.
The court of chancery held that the plaintiffs’ challenges to the
actions taken by the Santa Fe board to defend against the
competing Union Pacific deal implicated the duty of loyalty and
130
were not extinguished by a fully informed stockholder vote. The
court dismissed those claims on the merits on the grounds that
131
enhanced scrutiny did not apply to a stock-for-stock merger.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal of the disclosure claims, thereby determining that the
132
vote was fully informed. The plaintiffs did not appeal from the
Delaware Court of Chancery’s ruling that the fully informed
stockholder vote extinguished any claims that the Santa Fe board
133
breached its duty of care.
The defendants argued that the
stockholder vote also extinguished any loyalty-based challenge to
134
the Santa Fe board’s actions. The supreme court rejected this
135
argument.
Initially, the Delaware Supreme Court declined to determine
whether the actions of the Santa Fe board should be categorized as
breaches of loyalty or care, stating “Revlon and Unocal and the
duties of a Board when faced with a contest for corporate control
136
do not admit of easy categorization as duties of care or loyalty.”
The supreme court posited that “[i]n any event, categorizing these
more specific duties as primarily arising from due care or loyalty
would not be nearly as helpful in determining the effect of a fullyinformed stockholder vote as would an examination of their
137
underlying purposes.”
On this latter point, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled as
follows:

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 62.
Id. at 67.
Id.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 67.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Permitting the vote of a majority of stockholders on a
merger to remove from judicial scrutiny unilateral Board
action in a contest for corporate control would frustrate
the purposes underlying [enhanced scrutiny]. Board
action which coerces stockholders to accede to a
transaction to which they otherwise would not agree is
problematic. Thus, enhanced judicial scrutiny of Board
action is designed to assure that stockholders vote or
decide to tender in an atmosphere free from undue
coercion.
In voting to approve the Santa Fe-Burlington merger,
the Santa Fe stockholders were not asked to ratify the
Board’s unilateral decision to erect defensive measures
against the Union Pacific offer. The stockholders were
merely offered a choice between the Burlington Merger
and doing nothing. The Santa Fe stockholders did not
vote in favor of the precise measures under challenge in
the complaint. Here, the defensive measures had
allegedly already worked their effect before the
stockholders had a chance to vote. In voting on the
merger, the Santa Fe stockholders did not specifically vote
in favor of the Rights Plan, the Joint Tender or the
138
Termination Fee.
The supreme court concluded that “[s]ince the stockholders of
Santa Fe merely voted in favor of the merger and not the defensive
139
measures, we decline to find ratification in this instance.”
The Delaware Supreme Court then proceeded to review the
actions of the Santa Fe board under the enhanced scrutiny
140
standard. In examining the defensive actions taken by the Santa
Fe board, the supreme court noted that “[t]his case differs from
cases where the presumption of the business judgment rule
attaches ab initio and to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff
141
must allege well-pleaded facts to overcome the presumption.”
The court quoted the following allegation from the complaint:
The Individual Defendants breached their fiduciary
duties of loyalty and care by proceeding with and
completing the Joint Offer, which placed approximately
16% ownership in the hands of BNI, adopting the Poison

138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 71.
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Pill and applying it in a discriminatory manner by
exempting its application as to one bidder but maintaining it as to all other interested parties, amending the
Poison Pill to allow Allegheny to increase its ownership of
Santa Fe to 14.9%, and authorizing the Repurchase
142
Program.
The court then observed that:
The complaint does not admit that the Board had
proper grounds for its decision. Nor does the Board enjoy
a presumption to that effect. The complaint does not
adopt as true the facts set forth in the Proxy Statement.
Thus, without benefit of the Joint Proxy, the Board
cannot rely on any allegations of the complaint to meet its
burden under Unocal and Unitrin to come forward with
evidence supporting the reasonableness of its perception
of the threat posed by Union Pacific and the
143
proportionality of the response thereto.
Having made these preliminary rulings, the Delaware Supreme
Court reversed the Delaware Court of Chancery’s dismissal of the
complaint with the following caution:
This case may very well illustrate the difficulty of
expeditiously dispensing with claims seeking enhanced
judicial scrutiny at the pleading stage where the complaint
is not completely conclusory. . . . Here, there are wellpleaded allegations on the Unocal claim. As the
terminology of enhanced judicial scrutiny implies, boards
can expect to be required to justify their decisionmaking,
within a range of reasonableness, when they adopt
defensive measures with implications for corporate
control. This scrutiny will usually not be satisfied by
resting on a defense motion merely attacking the
144
pleadings.
145
The court remanded the case for further proceedings.
Under Santa Fe, it would appear that enhanced scrutiny will
continue to apply “at the pleading stage,” notwithstanding a fully
146
informed stockholder vote. It also would appear that the burden
would remain on the directors “to justify their decisionmaking,
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 71–72.
Id. at 72.
Id.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 72.
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within a range of reasonableness, when they adopt defensive
measures with implications for corporate control,” regardless of
whether those defensive measures were separate from the merger
agreement, such as the rights plan and joint tender, or part of the
147
merger agreement itself, such as the termination fee. It would
further seem that the pleading burden in such a case “differs from
cases where the presumption of the business judgment rule
attaches ab initio and to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff
148
must allege well-pleaded facts to overcome the presumption.”
Another of Santa Fe’s teachings would appear to be that “the
duties of a Board when faced with a contest for corporate control
149
do not admit of easy categorization as duties of care or loyalty.”
The ambiguity results from the fact that the same types of defensive
devices can be used for good (e.g., to enhance stockholder value)
or for ill (e.g., as entrenchment measures or to steer a deal to a
favored bidder), and that until there is an opportunity to hear
evidence and take the case beyond the pleadings stage, it would be
impossible for a court to make a motive-based distinction.
Moreover, at the pleadings stage, the plaintiff is entitled to all
reasonably conceivable inferences, and Delaware Court of
Chancery Rule 8(b) provides that motive can be pleaded
150
generally.
The Delaware Supreme Court has never explicitly called into
question, much less overruled these aspects of Santa Fe. As long as
they remain good law, the case stands as an apparent impediment
to the view that a fully informed stockholder vote on a merger
otherwise subject to enhanced scrutiny causes the transaction to be
reviewed under the business judgment rule.
B.

Gantler

The Gantler decision arguably takes matters further than Santa
Fe. Gantler involved a challenge to a reclassification that would
uniquely benefit the incumbent board members of First Niles
151
Financial, Inc. In 2003 the board of directors of First Niles

147. Id.
148. Id. at 71.
149. Id. at 67.
150. See DEL. CT. CH. R. 8(a); Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg.
Capital Holdings L.L.C., 27 A.3d 531, 536 (Del. 2011).
151. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 704 (Del. 2009).
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“decided that First Niles should put itself up for sale.”
Management disagreed, arguing against a sale and in favor of
delisting the company from NASDAQ, reincorporating in
153
Maryland, and continuing to operate as a standalone entity. The
board initially declined to pursue management’s proposal, opting
instead to retain an investment advisor and solicit third-party
154
bids.
155
Three potential acquirers submitted bid letters. Farmers
National Banc Corp. made a proposal, but stated in its bid letter
156
that it had no plans to retain the First Niles board. Both the
Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery
cited this fact and noted that “the Board did not further pursue the
157
Farmers’ offer.”
Cortland Bancorp offered consideration of
$18.00 per share, comprised of forty-nine percent in cash and
158
fifty-one percent in stock. First Place Financial Corp. proposed an
159
all-stock transaction valued at $18.00 to $18.50 per share. The
investment advisor opined that all three bids were within the range
160
of value suggested by its financial models. Management again
161
proposed its privatization strategy.
The board instructed management to provide due diligence to
Cortland and First Place, but management dragged its feet during
162
163
due diligence. Cortland withdrew. First Place increased the
164
value of exchange offer. The board’s financial advisor described
165
the offer “in positive terms.” According to the Delaware Supreme
Court’s decision, “[w]ithout any discussion or deliberation . . . the

152. Id. at 700.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. Neither decision describes the terms of the Farmers proposal. The
complaint did not describe it either.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 701.
165. Id.
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166

Board voted 4 to 1 to reject that offer.” Management then
167
renewed its privatization proposal in modified form.
Under the new privatization proposal, holders of 300 or fewer
shares would have their shares converted into Series A Preferred
168
Stock on a one-to-one basis. The Series A Preferred Stockholders
would receive a higher dividend than the common stock holders,
169
but would not have any preference on liquidation. The Series A
Preferred Stockholders also would not have any voting rights
170
except in connection with a sale of the company. Management
argued that the privatization proposal
was the best method to privatize the Company because it
allowed maximum flexibility for future capital management activities, such as open market purchases and
negotiated buy-backs. Moreover, First Niles could achieve
the Reclassification without having to buy back shares in a
171
fair market appraisal.
Several months later, the board approved the reclassification
172
proposal substantially in the form proposed by management.
Because the reclassification required a charter amendment,
section 242 of the DGCL mandated that the proposal receive
173
stockholder approval.
A majority of the outstanding shares
174
(57.30%) approved the transaction. After taking judicial notice of
the voting counts, the Delaware Court of Chancery determined that
175
50.28% of the unaffiliated shares voted in favor. For a range of
reasons, including the doctrine of ratification, the court of
chancery held that the complaint challenging the reclassification
176
failed to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 702.
173. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (West, Westlaw through 79 Laws 2014).
174. Gantler, 965 A.2d at 703.
175. Id.; see also Gantler v. Stephens, Civ. A. No. 2392-VCP, 2008 WL 401124,
at *16–17 (Del. Ch. Feb. 14, 2008) (calculating 50.28% figure as a percentage of
the unaffiliated shares outstanding).
176. See Gantler, 2008 WL 401124, at *23.
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On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the
177
Delaware Court of Chancery’s ratification ruling. The Delaware
Supreme Court found that the complaint pled material
misrepresentations, but also held that “because a shareholder vote
was required to amend the certificate of incorporation, that
approving vote could not also operate to ‘ratify’ the challenged
178
conduct of the interested directors.”
179
Justice Jacobs authored the appellate decision. While serving
as a Vice Chancellor in 1995, Justice Jacobs had authored another
influential opinion, known as Wheelabrator II, that identified various
180
difficulties in Delaware’s stockholder approval jurisprudence.
181
The Wheelabrator II opinion traced these difficulties
to the
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Van Gorkom, where the
defendant directors argued to the Delaware Supreme Court that
“the stockholders’ ‘overwhelming’ vote approving the Pritzker
Merger Agreement had the legal effect of curing any failure of the
Board to reach an informed business judgment in its approval of
182
the merger.” Agreeing with this legal proposition but not its
application on the facts, the Delaware Supreme Court observed
that “[t]he parties tacitly agree that a discovered failure of the
Board to reach an informed business judgment in approving the
183
merger constitutes a voidable, rather than void, act.” Unfortunately, this language confusingly implied that a care-based
challenge to a decision that the board undeniably had the power to
make implicated the quite different concepts of voidness and
voidability. The Van Gorkom decision reinforced this implication by
stating that “[h]ence, the merger can be sustained, notwithstanding the infirmity of the Board’s action, if its approval by
majority vote of the shareholders is found to have been based on
184
an informed electorate.” But as Wheelabrator II explained, a more
177. Gantler, 965 A.2d at 699.
178. Id. at 712.
179. Id. at 698.
180. See Wheelabrator II, 663 A.2d 1194 (Del. Ch. 1995).
181. Id. at 1200.
182. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 889 (Del. 1985), overruled in part by
Gantler, 965 A.2d at 713 n.54.
183. Id.
184. Id. In fairness to the Van Gorkom court, there was linguistic precedent for
using the concepts of voidness and voidability to refer to fiduciary breaches. In its
1979 decision in Michelson v. Duncan, the Delaware Supreme Court suggested that
a board decision made in bad faith and not in the best interests of the corporation
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fundamental problem with Van Gorkom was simply the terminology
that the Delaware Supreme Court used when discussing the
effectiveness of the vote, which repeatedly included the terms
185
“ratify” and “ratification.”
In Wheelabrator II, then-Vice Chancellor Jacobs criticized Van
Gorkom’s imprecise use of the term “shareholder ratification” and
argued for the need to distinguish between (1) ratification in its
“‘classic’ or paradigmatic form,” which “describes the situation
where shareholders approve board action that, legally speaking,
could be accomplished without any shareholder approval,” and
(2) “the effect of an informed shareholder vote that was statutorily
186
required for the transaction to have legal existence.” Justice
Jacobs nevertheless implied that a stockholder vote would have the
was “void.” 407 A.2d 211, 218–19 (Del. 1979). Delaware Court of Chancery
decisions have picked up on this language by describing decisions tainted by
breaches of the duty of loyalty as “void” and decisions tainted by breaches of the
duty of care as “voidable.” See, e.g., Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1114
(Del. Ch. 1999) (citing Michelson and Van Gorkom in support of this distinction);
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Exponential Tech., Inc., No. 16315, 1999 WL 39547,
at *6–7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 21, 1999) (citing Michelson). I personally understand the
concepts of voidness and voidability to be directed towards whether the corporate
actor had authority to make the challenged decision under the DGCL, charter, or
bylaws. If the authority exists, then a fiduciary challenge could result in an order
rescinding the action and declaring it invalid, but it would not be either voidable
or void. The concepts are inapt for fiduciary analysis, where the question is not
whether the board had the power to act, but rather whether the board exercised
its power equitably. Put differently, using Professor Berle’s concept of “twice
tested” actions, the issues of voidness and voidability go to the first (legal) test, not
to the second (equitable) test. See generally Adolph A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as
Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) (“[I]n every case, corporate
action must be twice tested: first, by the technical rules having to do with the
existence and proper exercise of the power; second, by equitable rules somewhat
analogous to those which apply in favor of a cestui que trust to the trustee’s exercise
of wide powers granted to him in the instrument making him a fiduciary.”).
185. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 890. The Delaware Supreme Court wrote:
The settled rule in Delaware is that “where a majority of fully
informed stockholders ratify action of even interested directors, an
attack on the ratified transaction normally must fail.” The question of
whether shareholders have been fully informed such that their vote
can be said to ratify director action, “turns on the fairness and
completeness of the proxy materials submitted by the management to
the . . . shareholders.”
Id. (quoting Gerlach v. Gillam, 139 A.2d 591, 593 (Del. Ch. 1958); Michelson,
407 A.2d at 220).
186. Wheelabrator II, 663 A.2d 1194, 1201–03, n.4 (Del. Ch. 1995).
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same legal effect “irrespective of whether that shareholder vote is
187
legally required for the transaction to attain legal existence.” In
other words, although different terminology should be used to
describe the legal effect, an organic vote could change the standard
of review.
In Gantler, quoting extensively from his decision in
Wheelabrator II, Justice Jacobs observed on behalf of the Delaware
Supreme Court that the doctrine of ratification “might be thought
to lack coherence because the decisions addressing the effect of
188
shareholder ‘ratification’” had used the term in different ways.
There was ratification in its “classic” form, which described a
situation where stockholders approved board action that, “legally
speaking, could be accomplished without any shareholder
189
approval.” But there were also cases that used the term “to
describe the effect of an informed shareholder vote that was
190
statutorily required for the transaction to have legal existence.”
Speaking for the unanimous court, Justice Jacobs stated that
going forward, only “classic” ratification would be recognized:
To restore coherence and clarity to this area of our
law, we hold that the scope of the shareholder ratification
doctrine must be limited to its so-called “classic” form;
that is, to circumstances where a fully informed
shareholder vote approves director action that does not
legally require shareholder approval in order to become
legally effective. Moreover, the only director action or
conduct that can be ratified is that which the shareholders
are specifically asked to approve. With one exception, the
“cleansing” effect of such a ratifying shareholder vote is to
subject the challenged director action to business
judgment rule, as opposed to “extinguishing” the claim
altogether (i.e., obviating all judicial review of the
191
challenged action).
The Gantler decision expressly overruled Van Gorkom “[t]o the
192
extent that [it] holds otherwise.”

187. Id. at 1201 n.4.
188. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 (Del. 2009) (quoting
Wheelabrator II, 663 A.2d at 1201–02, n.4).
189. Id. (quoting Wheelabrator II, 663 A.2d at 1201–02, n.4).
190. Id. (quoting Wheelabrator II, 663 A.2d at 1201–02, n.4).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 713 n.54.
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Consistent with his discussion in Wheelabrator II, Justice Jacobs
explained that nothing in Gantler “should be read as altering the
well-established principle that void acts such as fraud, gift, waste
and ultra vires acts cannot be ratified by a less than unanimous
193
shareholder vote.” Justice Jacobs also explained that nothing in
Gantler was “intended to affect or alter our jurisprudence governing
the effect of an approving vote of disinterested shareholders under
194
[section 144].”
Applying these principles, the Delaware Supreme Court
rejected the Delaware Court of Chancery’s dismissal of the
challenge to the reclassification:
The Court of Chancery held that although Count III
of the complaint pled facts establishing that the
Reclassification Proposal was an interested transaction not
entitled to business judgment protection, the
shareholders’ fully informed vote “ratifying” that Proposal
reinstated the business judgment presumption. That
ruling was legally erroneous . . . . [T]he ratification
doctrine does not apply to transactions where shareholder
approval is statutorily required. Here, the Reclassification
could not become legally effective without a statutorily
mandated shareholder vote approving the amendment to
First Niles’ certificate of incorporation. . . . Therefore, the
approving shareholder vote did not operate as a
“ratification” of the challenged conduct in any legally
195
meaningful sense.
The supreme court held that the complaint sufficiently alleged that
a majority of the board was interested in the reclassification, that
entire fairness therefore applied, and that the complaint could not
196
be dismissed.
If read in isolation, Gantler might be construed to suggest by
negative implication that an organic vote required by the DGCL
does not have any effect on an underlying fiduciary challenge or
the applicable standard of review. If interpreted in that fashion,
then Gantler could be seen as broadening Santa Fe, rather than
limiting it, so that after Gantler, the stockholder vote addressed in
Santa Fe would not even cleanse a challenge to the merger price.

193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 714.
Id.
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A Quarter Century of Effort at Clarification

Rather than being seen as holding that an organic vote cannot
affect the standard of review, Gantler should be seen as a definitive
step in a quarter century of judicial effort to clarify Van Gorkom’s
loose language about stockholder ratification. As then-Vice
Chancellor Jacobs explained in Wheelabrator II, Delaware decisions
addressing stockholder voting sometimes conflated separate issues
or deployed unclear terminology, such as (1) using the term
“ratification” to refer to an organic vote, (2) referring to board
decisions involving a breach of fiduciary duty as void, (3) importing
concepts and procedures from the safe harbor of section 144, and
(4) speaking in terms of claims being extinguished or barred in
197
their entirety. In Wheelabrator II, Justice Jacobs distinguished
between stockholder votes that were not required for the corporate
action to be effective, which he termed “classic ratification,” and
198
organic votes, which should not be termed ratification. Again,
and critically, the Wheelabrator II decision indicated that a
stockholder vote would have the same legal effect “irrespective of
whether that shareholder vote is legally required for the transaction
199
to attain legal existence.”
After Wheelabrator II, the Delaware Supreme Court and the
Delaware Court of Chancery made attempts to address the
200
confusion in this area. In Williams v. Geier, the Delaware Supreme
Court sought to eliminate any confusion over the use of the term
“ratification.” Plainly cognizant of Wheelabrator II, which it cited, the
Delaware Supreme Court carefully distinguished between
(1) “cases . . . where stockholders are called upon to ratify action
which may involve a transaction with an interested director or
where the transaction approved by the board may otherwise be
voidable,” and (2) cases involving “the effect of corporate action
which, in order to become operative, requires and receives both
201
approval by the board of directors and stockholders.”
The
Williams case involved a challenge to a charter amendment, so the
Delaware Supreme Court “put to one side” the first category of
cases, which it described as “not relevant” and “entirely
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Wheelabrator II, 663 A.2d 1194, 1200–05 (Del. Ch. 1995).
Id. at 1201 n.4.
Id.
671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996).
Id. at 1379.
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202

different.” In a footnote, the Williams court took on the question
of terminology:
The term “ratification” is, in the dictionary sense, a
generic term connoting official approval, confirmation or
sanction. Thus, it is not incorrect to consider broadly that
stockholder approval in either sense may be called
“ratification.” But where the organic act (such as those
occurring under Section 242) necessarily requires
stockholder approval for its effectuation, it may be
preferable to employ the statutory usage—viz., “to vote in
203
favor” or, simply, stockholder approval.
The Delaware Supreme Court did not, however, take action beyond
expressing this cautionary note.
204
Next came Chancellor Allen’s opinion in Lewis v. Vogelstein.
Like Williams and Wheelabrator II, Lewis began by distinguishing the
stockholder vote at issue from “those instances in which
shareholder votes are a necessary step in authorizing a
205
transaction.” The Lewis case challenged a stock option plan
under which the members of the board of Mattel, Inc. would
206
receive options. The board indisputably had the power to adopt
the plan without a stockholder vote, but the board had obtained a
207
vote regardless. Chancellor Allen made clear that “the law of
ratification as here discussed has no direct bearing on shareholder
action to amend a certificate of incorporation or bylaws; nor does
that law bear on shareholder votes necessary to authorize a merger,
a sale of substantially all the corporation’s assets, or to dissolve the
208
enterprise.”
Initially, Chancellor Allen held that absent the vote, the
standard of review would be entire fairness with the burden of
209
proof on the defendants. He then explained the four possible

202. Id.
203. Id. at 1379 n.24.
204. 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997).
205. Id. at 334.
206. Id. at 329.
207. Id. at 330.
208. Id. at 334 (comparing this case to Williams, 671 A.2d 1368).
209. Id. at 333 (“As the Plan contemplates grants to the directors that
approved the Plan and who recommended it to the shareholders, we start by
observing that it constitutes self-dealing that would ordinarily require that the
directors prove that the grants involved were, in the circumstances, entirely fair to
the corporation.”).
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effects that the stockholder vote on an interested transaction could
have:
First, one might conclude that an effective shareholder
ratification acts as a complete defense to any charge of
breach of duty. Second, one might conclude that the effect
of such ratification is to shift the substantive test on
judicial review of the act from one of fairness . . . to one of
waste. Third, one might conclude that the ratification
shifts the burden of proof of unfairness to plaintiff, but
leaves that shareholder-protective test in place. Fourth, one
might conclude (perhaps because of great respect for the
collective action disabilities that attend shareholder action
in public corporations) that shareholder ratification offers
no assurance of assent of a character that deserves judicial
210
recognition.
The Chancellor observed that “[e]xcepting the fourth of these
effects, there are cases in this jurisdiction that reflect each of these
211
approaches.”
After broadly surveying the concept of ratification and its
origins, Chancellor Allen held that the effect of the stockholder
vote approving the option plan was to extinguish any challenge to
212
the plan other than on grounds of waste. He nevertheless denied
the motion to dismiss, finding that the directors’ grants of options
to themselves seemed at the pleadings stage “sufficiently unusual to
require the court to refer to evidence before making an
213
adjudication of their validity and consistency with fiduciary duty.”

210. Id. at 334.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 338.
213. Id. at 339. Notably, Chancellor Allen’s list of alternatives in Lewis v.
Vogelstein did not identify the possibility that the stockholder vote could change the
standard of review from entire fairness to the business judgment rule, at which
point the plaintiff would have the burden to rebut one of its presumptions.
Presumably this was because the plaintiffs in Lewis easily could have rebutted the
presumption of loyalty: because all of the directors would receive options under
the plan they approved, they were interested in that decision. If the effect of the
vote was merely to restore the business judgment rule but then to allow the
plaintiff to overcome the rule by pleading the same director interest that was
disclosed to stockholders, then the vote would have no effect at all.
It might seem that this analytical problem could be sidestepped by requiring
the plaintiff to plead a different basis, other than the disclosed conflicts, to rebut
the presumptions of the business judgment rule. In other words, to give the vote
meaning, a plaintiff would not be able to rely on the disclosed conflict. But if the
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Wheelabrator II, Williams, and Lewis settled for a time the
taxonomy of stockholder approval under Delaware law. The cases
enforced the traditional meaning of ratification, limited it to
voluntary votes, and sharply distinguished voluntary votes from
organic votes. But the cases did not hold that an organic vote would
have no effect. To the contrary, Wheelabrator II recognized that a
stockholder vote would have the same effect “irrespective of
whether that shareholder vote is legally required for the transaction
214
to attain legal existence.”
The next generation of Delaware Court of Chancery opinions,
215
however, did not maintain the careful distinction in terminology.
In General Motors Class H, the court of chancery declined to
216
distinguish between a voluntary vote and an organic vote. The
case involved a vote on a charter amendment pursuant to section
242 of the DGCL, but the opinion used the language of ratification
and described the organic vote as operating to “bar” claims for
217
breaches of care and loyalty. Similarly in Harbor Finance Partners v.
plaintiff would have to identify an undisclosed conflict, then the vote would not
have any effect in the first place because it would not be fully informed.
Consequently, the practical effect of restoring business judgment review is to
change the standard of review to one of waste, as Chancellor Allen’s list suggested.
214. Wheelabrator II, 663 A.2d 1194, 1201 n.4 (Del. Ch. 1995).
215. See, e.g., In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 114–15 (Del. Ch.
2007) (addressing effect of organic merger vote and stating “[w]hen disinterested
stockholders make a mature decision about their economic self-interest, judicial
second-guessing is almost completely circumscribed by the doctrine of
ratification”); In re PNB Holding Co. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 28-N, 2006
WL 2403999, at *14 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006) (considering merger and explaining
that “outside the Lynch context, proof that an informed, non-coerced majority of
the disinterested stockholders approved an interested transaction has the effect of
invoking business judgment rule protection for the transaction and, as a practical
matter, insulating the transaction from revocation and its proponents from
liability”); In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 736–38 (Del. Ch. 1999)
(using language of ratification in holding that fully informed stockholder vote
approving a merger otherwise subject to enhanced scrutiny restored business
judgment standard of review and resulted in dismissal of complaint); Solomon v.
Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1115–17 (Del. Ch. 1999) (explaining that when a
transaction requires an organic vote under the DGCL, “shareholder ratification
can have a penetrating legal effect,” to wit “an informed and uncoerced
shareholder vote on the matter provides an independent reason to maintain
business judgment protection for the board’s acts”).
216. In re General Motors Class H S’holders Litig., 734 A.2d 611, 612–13 (Del.
Ch. 1999).
217. Id. at 616. The General Motors Class H decision distinguished Santa Fe as a
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218

Huizenga, the court of chancery gave ratifying effect to an organic
219
vote required by section 251.
The author of both decisions, then-Vice Chancellor Strine,
noted in Harbor Finance that he was “keenly aware that ‘classic
ratification’ involves the ‘voluntary addition of an independent
layer of shareholder approval in circumstances where such
220
approval is not legally required.’” Nevertheless, “[f]or want of
better nomenclature” he used the term to describe “a stockholder
vote sufficient to invoke the business judgment rule standard of
review,” which would include a statutorily required stockholder
221
vote.
Against this background, Gantler appears to be an effort to
return to the taxonomy of Wheelabrator II, Williams, and Lewis by
reestablishing the sharp distinction in terminology that was
suggested in Wheelabrator II. Only the effect of a voluntary vote is
properly termed “ratification,” and the effect of the vote is to
“subject the challenged director action to business judgment
222
review.” Read in this fashion, Gantler does not imply that an
organic vote has no effect. It rather recognizes that whatever the
effect may be, it is not properly called ratification. As in Williams,
voluntary vote cases and organic vote cases are “entirely different”
223
and “not relevant” to each other.
By contrast, if Gantler actually held that an organic vote cannot
affect the standard of review, then the decision would have
represented a radical break with precedent. For the price of
clarifying the linguistic confusion that Van Gorkom created, the
decision would have overruled the parade of precedents—
including Wheelabrator II—that held that an organic vote does affect
the standard of review. Nothing about Gantler suggests an intention
case involving a situation where “the defendants are attempting to use the
stockholder vote to insulate themselves from responsibility for decisions not
directly at issue in the vote.” Id. at 617. The decision also distinguished situations
where there are “concerns about ‘implied coercion’ such as has been found to
exist where a controlling stockholder dominates the corporation.” Id.
218. 751 A.2d 879 (Del. Ch. 1999).
219. Id. at 881.
220. Id. at 900 n.78 (quoting Wheelabrator II, 663 A.2d 1194, 1201–02, n.4 (Del.
Ch. 1995)).
221. Id.
222. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 (Del. 2009).
223. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1379 (Del. 1996); see supra text
accompanying notes 201–03.
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to overrule so many cases or such a significant aspect of Delaware
doctrine. To the contrary, it appears that Gantler intended to
elevate the trial court level discussion in Wheelabrator II to the status
of authoritative Delaware Supreme Court precedent.
Gantler’s treatment of Santa Fe similarly indicates that the
Delaware Supreme Court did not intend to suggest that an organic
vote cannot affect the standard of review. Recall that in Santa Fe,
the Delaware Supreme Court agreed that the organic vote on the
Santa Fe-Burlington merger provided grounds for dismissing the
complaint to the extent it alleged claims that the board breached
224
its duty of care. If the Gantler court intended that an organic vote
could never affect the standard of review, then the Gantler decision
would have overruled Santa Fe on this issue, just as it overruled Van
Gorkom. Instead, the Gantler decision cited Santa Fe with approval in
support of the proposition that “the only director action or
conduct that can be ratified is that which the shareholders are
225
specifically asked to approve.” In a footnote, the Gantler decision
stated:
We previously so held in [Santa Fe], which involved a
claim that by adopting defensive measures to block an
unsolicited takeover bid, the directors of the target
corporation breached their fiduciary duties. The Court of
Chancery held that that claim had been extinguished by
the “ratifying” shareholder vote approving a subsequent
merger of the target corporation. Reversing that ruling,
this Court held that “[s]ince the stockholders of Santa Fe
merely voted in favor of the merger and not the defensive
measures, we decline to find ratification in this
226
instance.”
The Gantler court did not hold that the Santa Fe decision’s analysis
of the effect of the organic approval required for the merger was
otherwise wrong.
Most tellingly, Justice Jacobs included a footnote in Gantler that
took pains to explain the confirmatory nature of the decision: “This
Opinion clarifies that ‘ratification’ legally describes only corporate
action where stockholder approval is not statutorily required for its
227
effectuation.”
Consistent with the clarifying nature of the
224.
225.
226.
227.

In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 67 (Del. 1995).
Gantler, 965 A.2d at 713.
Id. at 713 n.53 (quoting Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 68).
Id. at 714 n.55.
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decision, Justice Jacobs went out of his way to explain that the
Gantler opinion did not alter Delaware law regarding the
unanimous approval standard for ratifying fraud, gift, waste, or
ultra vires acts, nor stockholder approval jurisprudence under
228
section 144. It would be strange to think that despite these
careful efforts, the Delaware Supreme Court intended to hold that
stockholder approval of a merger could have no effect on the
standard of review. Subsequent Delaware Court of Chancery
229
decisions have not interpreted Gantler as having this implication.
Viewed from this perspective, Gantler is primarily a decision
about terminology—which is not to minimize its importance.
Language matters greatly in law. As Chancellor Allen once noted,
“in the law, to an extent present in few other human institutions,
there may be in the long run as much importance ascribed to the
reasoning said to justify action, as there is in the actions
230
themselves.” On two other occasions, the Delaware Supreme
Court has gone out of its way to alter terminology. In Stroud v.
Grace, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected the term “duty of
candor,” which Delaware decisions frequently deployed, finding
that it had “no well accepted meaning in the disclosure context”
231
and that “[i]ts use is both confusing and imprecise.” The Stroud
opinion instructed courts to instead “speak of a duty of disclosure
232
based on a materiality standard.” In Arnold v. Society for Saving
233
Bancorp, the Delaware Supreme Court made a similar effort to
squash colloquial phrases like “Revlon duties” and “Revlon-land,”
228. Id. at 713 n.54.
229. See In re Morton’s Rest. Grp., Inc. S’holders Litig., 74 A.3d 656, 663 n.34
(Del. Ch. 2013) (“[I]t is plain that, when disinterested approval of a sale to an
arm’s-length buyer is given by a majority of stockholders who have had the chance
to consider whether or not to approve a transaction for themselves, there is a long
and sensible tradition of giving deference to the stockholders’ voluntary decision,
invoking the business judgment rule standard of review, and limiting any
challenges to the difficult argument that the transaction constituted waste.”);
In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 793 n.113 (Del.
Ch. 2011) (expressing the view that in the absence of a majority stockholder or de
facto controller, “the approval of an uncoerced, disinterested electorate of a
merger (including a sale) would have the effect of invoking the business judgment
rule standard of review”).
230. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 10389, 1989 WL 7036,
at *1156 n.13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989).
231. 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992).
232. Id.
233. 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss4/8

48

Laster: The Effect of Stockholder Approval on Enhanced Scrutiny

2014]

EFFECT OF STOCKHOLDER APPROVAL

1491

describing them as inappropriate references “to the enhanced
234
scrutiny courts accord to certain types of transactions.” Gantler
appears to be a similar attempt to clarify an area of the law by
starting with terminology.
V. CONCLUSION
Delaware decisions identify certain specific, recurring, and
readily identifiable situations that call for enhanced scrutiny—
Delaware’s intermediate standard of review. The Delaware courts’
recognition that particular scenarios require more careful judicial
review than business judgment deference does not trump the
foundational premise of judicial deference to a qualified corporate
decision maker. If a fully informed and disinterested stockholder
majority votes in favor of a transaction otherwise subject to
enhanced scrutiny, then the business judgment rule should
become the operative standard of review. This is true regardless of
whether the vote is an organic requirement of the DGCL or a
voluntary addition. Any complaint challenging such a transaction
should no longer benefit from enhanced scrutiny’s reasonableness
standard or the shifting of the burden of proof to the defendants.
Instead, the plaintiff should be required to plead facts sufficient to
overcome the business judgment rule’s presumptions.

234.

Id. at 1289 n.40.
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